In this paper, we study the semantics for the logics of preference based on possibility theory. Possibility distributions representing the preference between worlds are associated with the possible world models for dynamic logics. Then the preference between actions are determined by comparing some measures of their consequences. We de ne di erent logics of preference by considering the comparisons of possibility measures and guaranteed possibility measures. Some properties of the proposed logics are studied and their relationships with deontic logics are also considered.
Introduction
Deontic logic is the logic for reasoning about normative concepts. Deontic reasoning has been extensively exploited in ethics and legal philosophy since the ancient times. However, the rst modern formal system for deontic logic is not established until the fties 17] . Though the system is in uential on the later work, there are arising many paradoxes when it is applied to practical deontic reasoning, so alternative systems have also been proposed since then for the resolution of paradoxes 2]. Among them, the Meyer's approach is one of the most interesting ones 12]. His system is based on the reduction to dynamic logic 9], so actions and propositions can be both represented and the distinction between \ought-to-do" and \ought-to-be" can be made clearly. This also clari es much confusion caused by the inappropriate translation of practical deontic reasoning to formal systems.
On the other hand, while the di erent formal systems are mainly the consequence of foundational studies of deontic reasoning, the applications of deontic logics to computer science and arti cial intelligence has received more and more attention recently 13]. The applications include automated legal reasoning, electronic commerce, system speci cation, and so on. Since Meyer's system is strongly based on dynamic logic and the latter is the logic for reasoning about computer program, it is in particular suitable for the potential application.
In addition to the reduction to dynamic logic, another important feature of Meyer's logic is the use of a special propositional atom V , meaning the violation of law (or something like sanction, punishment, etc.). This special atom is originally introduced by Anderson 1] for reducing deontic logic to alethic modal logic. By using the special atom, an action is forbidden if the execution of it will necessarily lead to states in which V holds, and it is permitted if not forbidden. Moreover, an action is obligatory if failing to executing it will result in violation of law.
Though Meyer's logic is successful in reasoning about normative actions, it is inadequate in the representation of action preference. However, the norms are usually relative and con ict with other ones, so we may have to make some decision choices between con icting actions. For example, the violation of constitution is considered more serious than that of regulation laws, so we will try to obey the former instead of the latter provided that it is impossible to enforce both in the same time. Under the situations, we will need the capability of reasoning about action preference. In this paper, we will show that by extending Meyer's semantics with possibility theory This is an expanded and revised version of 10].
constructs, we can achieve the purpose. Intuitively, the possibility distribution will model the degrees of satisfaction of norms, and an action will be preferred to another one if it satis es the norms to a higher degree than the other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, Meyer's deontic logic and possibility theory are reviewed in the next section. Then a logic for deontic degree is proposed and its semantics is presented. In section 4, we consider a logic of action preference. Its relationship with deontic logics will also be studied. Then an alternative logic based on the minimal semantics (neighborhood semantics) of modal logics 4] is considered. Finally, we discuss some related works and further generalization in the concluding section.
2 Review of Deontic Logic and Possibility Theory
Deontic logic as dynamic logic
The system of Meyer's logic is called PD e L. The elementary symbols of the PD e L language consist of 1. A set of propositional letters, PV = fp; q; r; : : :g and a special propositional letter V not in PV , and 2. a set of atomic actions, A = fa; b; c; : : :g and three distinguished action symbols ;, u, and i 1 .
The set of well-formed formulas( ) and the set of action expressions( ) are de ned inductively in the following way. The w ]' means that if action is done, ' will hold. The action expressions ; ;
; & denote the sequential composition, nondeterministic choice, and simultaneous execution of and respectively, whereas means the non-execution of and ' ! = denotes that if ' holds then execute else execute .
Note that the language of PD e L is not the traditional one for dynamic logic. First, the Kleene star is not in . This is because in the deontic reasoning domain, the repetition of some actions is not so usual as in computer program. On the other hand, the simultaneous execution and non-execution of actions are nonstandard in dynamic logic. In fact, the two constructs signi cantly complicate the formal semantics of PD e L. Since the formal semantics is rather involved, we will only present the informal one based on the ordinary state transition semantics of dynamic logics.
A Kripke model for PD e L is a quadruple hW; j =; j j ]; opti, where W is a set of possible worlds and opt is a nonempty subset of W, meaning the best elements of W, whereas j = W and j j ] : ! P(W W) de ne the truth relation and the action denotation function respectively. It is required that j = and j j ] must satisfy the following constraints.
For all w 2 W, '; 2 , and 2 , (j =0) w j = V , w 6 2 opt, (j =1) w j = ' _ , w j = ' or w j = , (j =2) w j = :' , w 6 j = ', (j for all 2 . Here we use subscript m to indicate that the deontic operators are according to Meyer's de nitions. Let S f'g , then ' is a PD e L-consequence of S, denoted by S j = PDeL ', i for all PD e L models and w, w j = for all 2 S implies w j = '.
To facilitate the comparison between PD e L and the logics we will develop, we use a slight variant of it and still call it PD e L. In the variant, we assume the deontic operators are primitive logical symbols and drop the propositional atom V , so the formation rules for the w s are as follows: is the smallest set such that
PV
, and if '; 2 and 2 , then :'; ' _ ; ]'; O m ; P m ; F m 2 .
As for the semantics, the clause (j = 0) is replaced by three constraints for the deontic w s: 
Two viewpoints of the semantics
What distinguishes the semantics of PD e L from ordinary dynamic logic is the component opt. We can consider this component from two di erent viewpoints. In the rst one, the possible worlds are divided into two levels by opt. The level 1 worlds are those in opt and the level 2 are those not. This means that the worlds in opt are preferred to those not. A natural generalization of the semantics from this viewpoint is to allow multiple levels of division of the possible worlds. This is essentially what we will do in the next two sections. As for the second viewpoint, the set opt can be considered as an obligation (or a norm) in the sense that a state is in opt i it meets the requirement of the obligation. In this sense, PD e L is a logic for single obligation, so we can generalize it into one for multiple obligations. However, in the logic for multiple obligations, it is inevitable that mutually con icting obligations may exist in the same time and these obligations may be not equally important, so the further generalization is to allow multiple (and possibly con icting) obligations with di erent degrees of importance in the semantics. This will be essentially the main topic of section 5. The main role the possibility distributions will play is to encode the degree of preference of possible worlds or the degree of importance of obligations.
A Graded Deontic Logic
While deontic logics are relevant to reasoning with norms, we may be also interested in the more general logic of value concepts. For example, in the decision-making context, we may select some actions to do according to our preference. Most research on the logics of preference is based on the analysis of probability and utility theory. However, since possibility theory models ordering relation in a natural way, it should be suitable to use the theory in the analysis of preference relations. In this section, we will rst develop a kind of graded deontic logic, called GD e L, with semantics based on possibility theory. This logic, though does not involve with the comparison of action preference directly, may represent di erent degrees of permission, obligation and prohibition and will serve as a basis of prohairetic logics. The set of action expressions for GD e L ( 1 ) is simultaneously de ned with 1 by the same rules as in PD e L. The intuitive meaning of these graded deontic formulas is to represent the degree of obligation, permission and prohibition respectively. For example, P c g means that doing is permitted at least to the degree c.
A model of GD e L will be a quadruple hW; j =; j j ]; i, where W and j j ] are de ned as above, is a possibility distribution on W, and j = is as above except that the constraint (j =0) is replaced by (j =4) w j = P c g (resp. P >c g ) i ( j j ](w)) c (resp. > c). (j =5) w j = F c g (resp. F >c g ) i w j = :P c g (resp. w j = :P >c g ).
). For any world w, the possibility value (w) denotes the degree of \goodness" of w, so the graded deontic formulas re ect the degree of goodness of the states to which some action will lead. The GD e L consequence relation j = GDeL is de ned analogous to j = PDeL . Note that according to the semantics, F c 4. (deontic translation): 1 (2 m ) = 2 c g for any 2 and 2 = O; P, or F, Theorem 1 If S f'g , then S j = PDeL ' i 1 (S) j = GDeL 1 ('), Proof: The proof of the theorem relies on the following lemma. Lemma ' 2 , 2 , and w 2 W, w j = 0 ' i w j = 1 (') and j j ] 0 = j 1 ( )j ]. Proof: First, we note that 1 is a 1-1 mapping, so for each ' 2 1 ( ) and 2 1 ( ), the inverse mapping ?1 1 is well-de ned.
1. Given M, we de ne M 0 by j = 0 : for ' 2 1 ( ), w j = 0 ' i w j = ?1 1 ('), and for other w s in 1 , j = 0 can be de ned arbitrarily subject to the constraints (j = 1){(j = 6). .e. u 6 2 opt, so (j = 0:1) is satis ed. Now, to prove the main theorem, assume S 6 j = PDeL ', then there exists a model M and w 2 W such that w j = for all 2 S but w 6 j = '. By the lemma, we can also nd a GD e L model which is the witness of 1 (S) 6 j = GDeL 1 (').
The converse can be proved analogously, so this completes the proof.
We remark that if in the de nition of 1 , we replace 2 c g with 2 >c g in the deontic translation condition for any c < 1, the result still holds. Therefore, each graded deontic operator behaves just like its classical counterpart. So what is the advantage of employing GD e L? Why are in nitely many deontic operators behaving in the same way not just redundancy? The secret lies on the interaction of the class of graded deontic operators. If it is known that P c g and F d g both hold where d c, then we can reason that the degree of permission of is higher than that of , so we can compare the degree of permission, obligation and prohibition of di erent actions in GD e L. This will be helpful under the decision-making environment.
A Logic of Action Preference
Though GD e L can represent the degree of permission, obligation, and prohibition of actions directly, the comparison of preference between actions is not made explicit in the language. To exploit the full generality of our semantics, we can develop logics that include the comparative constructs directly.
To compare the preference between two actions, we will compare the resultant subsets of worlds after doing them. Now, given a possibility distribution on W and two subsets of W, A and B, there are at least four ways to compare them. Namely, we can de ne According to the semantics, 1 denotes a comparison of actions based on the optimistic view, so is preferred to if the execution of may lead to better worlds than , whereas 2 is a comparison based on the pessimistic view since is preferred to only when produces better results than under the worst condition.
The basic properties of LAP are as follows. Most of these properties easily follows from possibility theory. For simplicity, we omit the subscript LAP from j = LAP in the following propositions. Proposition 1 1. The action preference w s can be combined with the conditional action w s to denote a decision choice action. More speci cally, de ne
Then doing 1 will mean doing or selectively according to the optimistic preference relation 1 . The same de nition can be carried out for 2 .
We can also embody the unary deontic operators of PD e L by using the special actions u and ; or the comparison between an action and its negation. De ne the following translation mappings, 2 ; 3 ; 4 :
! 2 2 such that they all satisfy basic condition, action morphism, classical morphism, and Proof: The key step of the proof still depends on the model transformation between these two logics. However, strictly speaking, the translation mappings i 's are not 1-1 any more. What we have is a weaker result. For '; 2 , we said that ' and are logically equivalent if for any PD e L model M and w 2 W, w j = ' i w j = , and for ; 2 , we said that they are logically equivalent if for any PD e L model M, j j ] = j j ]. Then, we can show that if i (') = i ( )(resp. i ( ) = i ( )), then ' and (resp. and ) are logically equivalent. Thus, for the current purpose, we can again de ne the inverse mapping of i by letting ?1 i (') be an arbitrary element in the equivalence class that is mapped to ' by i . So, the model transformation process is just like that in the last proof. The main di erence lies on the transformation between opt and . The remaining part of the proof is completely the same as that for the last theorem.
The proof of the theorem shows how we can transform a multiple level preference model into a two-level one. The di erent translations of deontic formulas in LAP re ect the di erent ways we use in the transformation. In the rst translation, we let optimal worlds be those with maximal degree of preference, while in the second one, we let optimal worlds be those not minimal in the preference ordering. As for the third one, we can in fact take a threshold value, and let any worlds with degree of preference beyond the threshold be optimal worlds.
The result also shows that LAP is indeed more expressive than PD e L in deontic reasoning. Since the optimistic action preference connective 1 is used in the de nition of Meyer's deontic operators, it is expected that the same thing can be done for 2 . For example, we can de ne O 2 = 2 ; F 2 = 2 ; P 2 = :( 2 ); by the pessimistic preference connective.
Furthermore, we can also de ne some derived modal operators by using the special action i. Let I 1 = 1 i; D 1 = 1 i; I 2 = 2 i; D 2 = 2 i; then I 1 (resp. I 2 ) means it is strongly (resp. weakly) inclined to do , whereas D 1 (resp. D 2 ) means it is strongly (resp. weakly) declined to do . These derived operators should be useful for the representation and reasoning of agents' mental attitudes in the agent-oriented programming 16]. Before proceding to a more general logic, we would like to consider an illustrative example. The example is originally given in the decision theory context by Savage 15] and recently cited in 8].
Example 1 (Savage's omelette example) The problem is about the decision of adding an egg to a 5-egg omelette. The egg may be good or rotten and we have three available acts. g a 1 , P 0:8 g a 2 , P 0:6 g a 3 , F 0:9 g a 2 , and F 0:7 g a 3 , but we do not have F c g a 1 for any c. This means that a 1 is fully permitted and not forbidden at all, whereas a 2 is almost completely permitted and slightly forbidden and a 3 is moderately permitted and forbidden. On the other hand, since in this case, all a i 's are mutually exclusive (i.e., no two a i 's can be done simultaneously), we have a 1 = a 2 a 3 , a 2 = a 1 a 3 , and a 3 = a 1 a 2 , so we have O 0:9 g a 1 , but do not have O c g a 2 or O c g a 3 for any c. This means that only a 1 is slightly obligatory, whereas a 2 and a 3 are not obligatory at all although they are permitted to some degree.
Let us turn to the semantics of LAP, then in s 0 , we have a 1 1 a 2 1 a 3 and a 2 1 a 1 1 a 3 . This means that from an optimistic view, a 1 is the preferred action, whereas from a pessimistic one, the best choice is a 2 . In both cases, a 3 is the worst choice. Furthermore, if we adopt the translation mappings 2 or 4 , then we have O m a 1 , F m a 2 , and F m a 3 , so only a 1 is permitted (it is even obligatory), and a 2 and a 3 are forbidden. However, if we use the translation 3 , then all a i 's are permitted and none of them are obligatory or forbidden.
A Logic for Action under Con icting Obligations
Recently, a logic for con icting obligation has been proposed by Brown 3] , in which the preference ordering is set between obligations instead of worlds, where an obligation is represented by a subset of possible worlds. Since the intersection of two sets of possible worlds may be empty, the con icting obligations can be represented in the framework naturally. Then four unary deontic operators and a dyadic comparative operator are de ned. Their semantics based on the combination of quanti ers on the set of obligation and traditional deontic operators O and P. For example, one of them means for all obligations ' is obligatory. The formal semantic models of Brown's logic are the so-called minimal models in modal logic 4].
In this section, we will propose an alternative logic for action under con icting obligations (LACO) by assimilating Brown's idea into Meyer's framework.
The language is just that of PD e L (without Meyer's deontic operators) with six classes of unary deontic operators, hci O , hci + O , hci P , hci + P , hci F , and hci + F for all c 2 0; 1], and six binary connectives, j i (i = 1; 2; j = P; O; F). Let 3 and 3 denote the set of w s and action expressions for LACO respectively, then the formation rules for the w s are In the semantics above, the set fS j S \ j j ](w) 6 = ;g include all obligations that permit the execution of in w, if we consider the possibility distribution encode the degree of importance of these obligations, then (fS j S \ j j ](w) 6 = ;g) is just the degree of importance of the most important obligations that permit the execution of . Thus hci P means that is permitted according to an obligation with degree of importance at least c. Similarly, hci O denotes that is obligatory according to an obligation with degree of importance at least c, while hci F means that is forbidden according to an obligation with degree of importance at least c. Moreover, P 1 denote is permitted by some obligation that is more important than those permitting , and P 2 means that all obligations permitting are more important than those permitting . The similar interpretations can be given to O i and F i .
Obviously, a LACO model is a generalization of a PD e L one if we consider the opt component in the latter as a single obligation. However, it is in fact also a generalization of a GD e L and LAP model. To see that, let us rst prove a basic property in possibility theory. 2. If S f'g 2 , then S j = LAP ' i 6 (S) j = LACO 6 (').
Note that in the translation mapping 5 , the graded deontic w s F c g is mapped to a w of the form :hci P 0 instead of hci F 0 . The former means that for all obligations with degree of importance at least c, 0 is forbidden, while the latter only says that there exists such an obligation, so if there are indeed some obligations with degree of importance at least c(i.e. (2 W ) c), the former implies the latter. The same remark is applied to w s of the form F >c g , O c g , and O >c g . This means that in LACO, in addition to the graded deontic w s in GD e L, we can also express some weaker notions of partial prohibition and obligation. Furthermore, we have four additional binary connectives O i and F i (i = 1; 2) that are not available in LAP. Thus, LACO indeed improves the expressive power of GD e L and LAP further.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, the possibility theory and Meyer's semantics for deontic logics are combined to provide a semantics for action preference. We generalize Meyer's model step by step to provide the semantic basis for three logics. The logic GD e L can reason about graded normative behavior. In the logic LAP, we can compare the preference between actions and do decision choice according to the comparison. The third logic, LACO, is based on the semantics of con icting obligations. Our main theorems show that PD e L is less expressive than either GD e L or LAP in deontic reasoning, which in turn are less expressive than the most general logic, LACO. In what follows, we consider some related work and possible further research.
Related Works
The deontic operators and preference connectives considered in this paper are all applied to actions. However, there have been volumes of works on the deontic and preference logics of propositions 2, 14] . This kind of logics can also be considered in the present framework.
First, for GD e L, w s of the form 2 c g ' and 2 >c g ' can be added for 2 = O; F; P and ' 2 . In the semantics, replace j j ](w) by j'j = def fw j w j = 'g and by :'. Then when ' is a non-modal formula, P c g ' and O c g ' are just the w s (' c) and (' N 1 ? c) in possibilistic logic 6]. This also gives possibilistic logic a deontic interpretation. Second, for LAP, we can add w s of the form ' 1 and interpret it as j'j > 1 j j for any w s ' and .
Again, this type of w s are just equivalent to those of another well-known logics, called qualitative possibility logic (QPL), developed by Farinas del Cerro and Herzig 5] . It has been known that QPL has close relationship with conditional logic and nonmonotonic consequence relation 11], so the extension of the present framework to covering conditional and defeasible obligation will deserve further consideration.
Further generalization
In the above-mentioned semantics, a xed possibility distribution is associated with a model, so the logics are of static preference. However, there is no essential di culty in associating di erent possibility distributions with every possible world. Then we can get a variable preference relation. We believe that this step is necessary in developing dyadic deontic logics. Second, in the present framework, the denotation of each action is a binary transition relation on the set of possible worlds. That is, we do not consider the action uncertainty. Though j j ](w) denote the all possibilities of doing in w, it is not known which world is more possible than others. In the further research, we can interpret j j ] as a fuzzy binary relation so that j j ](w) is a possibility distribution or assign j j ](w) as a probability measure on W directly, then the expected payo of doing in w can be estimated as M where and are a kind of t-norms and co-t-norms respectively. Then the preference between two action can be compared via their expected payo . This will also provide a kind of decision-theoretic semantics for our logic. Third, the use of possibility theory forces our preference relation on possible worlds (or sets of possible worlds in the case of LACO) to be a connected ordering. This results in that we have only \don't care" incomparability (i.e.
:(w > u)^:(u > w)) but do not have \don't know" incomparability. This is indeed a limitation of our semantics, however, it can be easily overcome by allowing partial ordering between worlds. But the semantics then have to be written in qualitative terms. For example, w j = 1 i there exists u 2 j j ](w) such that for all v 2 j j ](w), u > v, where > is a partial ordering between worlds.
Forth, our system is only for single agent. To model multiagent environment, we must associate a preference relation for each agent in the model, then some actions, such as \request" and \commit", that will change the agents' preference can be considered in the framework and it can serve as a semantic basis of agent-oriented programming 16]. Moreover, the interference of di erent agents will change the choice of decision makers just like the situations analyzed by game theoreticians. These problems will all be considered in our long-term goal to the integration of di erent mental attitudes in a logical framework.
Finally, because the paper mainly concentrate on the semantic comparison of di erent logics, the prooftheoretical aspect of these logics are completely ignored. In fact, Meyer has provided an axiomatic system for PD e L. Since we have shown that the graded deontic operators in GD e L behave just like Meyer's ones, we can obtain an axiomatic system for GD e L by replacing classical deontic operators with graded ones and adding some bookkeeping axioms like P c g P d g if c > d. As for the axiomatic system for LAP, we believe the properties given in propositions 1 and 2 will provide a basis. The further development of these properties into an axiomatic system and the study of axiomatic system for LACO are all interesting topics for future research.
